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THE PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS: INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION IN ASCENDANCE
by Roger P.Alford*

The past two decades have seen an explosion of new international courts and tribunals.
Depending on one's count, more than fifty international courts and tribunals are now in
existence, with more than thirty of these established in the past twenty years. The rate of growth
has been so furious that government leaders now express concern over "tribunal fatigue."
Among the more noteworthy developments in this field in the past two decades are the
establishment of two new UN criminal tribunals, one new tribunal relating to the law of the sea,
four new or reinvigorated trade and investment tribunals, five new mass claim reparation tribunals, several new regional economic integration tribunals, numerous new human rights
tribunals, and one soon-to-be-established international criminal court.'
Moreover, international courts and tribunals are being utilized with greater and greater
frequency. Judge Stephen Schwebel describes the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as "busier
than ever before," and the numbers bear him out: In its first forty years of existence, the ICJ
handled 72 cases and rendered forty-five judgments. In the past three years, the ICJ has
rendered more than twenty contentious and advisory opinions and currently has twenty-four
pending cases on its docket. Likewise, in its first five years of existence, the World Trade
Organisation's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body has been notified of 190 complaints and has
rendered thirty-two decisions. Even more astounding, the mass claims tribunals have been
rendering decisions that number in the thousands. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has resolved
more than 3,000 claims, the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland
has rendered more than 7,500 decisions, the Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia
and Herzegovina has rendered more than 25,000 decisions, and the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) has resolved in excess of 125,000 claims.
While there has been a significant focus on a few international tribunals, there have been
insufficient efforts to compare and contrast the various courts and tribunals. Even a cursory
comparison of these tribunals reveals that there are many unanswered questions regarding the
interrelationship of these courts and tribunals and, more disturbing, aprofound lack of attention
to the collective impact these international tribunals are having on the field of international law.
That is changing, as is evidenced by the new Project on International Courts and Tribunals at
New York University School of Law, but we as an international legal community are still in the
earliest stages of analyzing the importance of these new tribunals. This lecture will sample a
few of the representative issues that merit further attention. I will offer concrete examples as
often as possible because I think such anecdotes best illustrate the impact of these tribunals.
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

One of the more important issues for practitioners regarding the growth of international
courts and tribunals is the impact these courts have as a source of international law. International courts and tribunals regularly render judicial decisions that are creating basic source
material for international law. While, in the past, international lawyers may have relied
principally on legal opinions emanating from the Peace Palace, they now regularly look to other
tribunals for additional guidance. Whether addressing overarching issues such as treaty
"SeniorLegal Adviser, Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland; Co-Chair, American
BarAssociation International Courts Committee; formerlegal assistant to the Hon. Richard Allison at the Iran-United
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interpretation pursuant to the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties or obscure questions
such as mitigation of damages under international law, these tribunals are now filling the void.
For instance, while in private practice in Washington representing corporate claimants
before the UNCC, I searched in vain for modern judicial pronouncements on the doctrine of
ex delicto non orituractio: the principle that an unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an
action in law. In the absence of modern judicial authority, we fell back on Bin Cheng's 1953
classic, GeneralPrinciplesofLaw, which referred to obscure nineteenth-century mixed-claim
commission decisions involving pirates seeking compensation for government seizure of their
ships. Fortunately, in 1998 a UNCC panel of commissioners, which included Professor David
Caron, filled the void and rendered a modem-day version of the doctrine. In addressing the
question of whether Gulf War claimants could pursue claims for losses relating to business
activities that violated the UN trade embargo against Iraq, the panel concluded as follows:
"Work that ... involve[s] the transfer of goods or capital to or from Iraq after 6 August 1990
violates the terms of the trade embargo and is not compensable."2
The doctrine also finds support at the tribunal I currently serve, the Claims Resolution
Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland (CRT). Can a Nazi heir pursue a claim for an
account holding assets that were looted from a Holocaust victim? The CRT's rules clearly say
no, stating that a claim shall be rejected if it is established by the preponderance of the evidence
that the assets in the account were looted from victims of Nazi persecution. Ex delicto non
orituractio.
These international tribunals are also relied upon by other international tribunals. The seed
of a doctrine on wrongful expropriation was planted by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in 1926. This doctrine grew to maturity with dozens of decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal in the 1980s. It then has been cultivated and has borne fruit in decisions by the UNCC
and panels of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Likewise, human rights tribunals often cite each other's decisions, fostering a fertile environ3
ment that has been aptly described by one scholar as "horizontal dialogue."
Yet despite the vast amount of judicial authority emanating from these international
tribunals, much of their jurisprudence remains undiscovered and untapped by international
lawyers. Many of the decisions are unavailable, and to the extent that they are in the public
domain, they are hidden in plain view, without the benefit of indexes, catalogues, digests or
other user-friendly search capabilities.
RELATIONSHIP WITH NATIONAL COURTS

A second key issue in a comparative analysis of international courts and tribunals is the
relationship of these courts with national courts. Jurisdictional issues arise in connection with
the relationship between international tribunals and national courts. In some instances, such as
that of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), an international tribunal will work closely with
national courts in interpreting and applying substantive treaty provisions. In other instances,
the international tribunal divests national courts ofjurisdiction, as is the case with the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal. This divestiture is so complete that last year the United States was found to
be in noncompliance with its Algiers Accords obligation simply by permitting private parties
4
to file lawsuits in U.S. courts in order to toll the applicable statute of limitations. The UNCC,
by contrast, is viewed as supplementary to any other dispute resolution mechanism, including
litigation before national courts. The UNCC's principal concern regarding its supplementary

Reipor andRcommendation ofthe Panelof CommissionersConcerningthe FirstInstalmentof "E2" Claims,
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'Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 UNiv. PENN. L. REv. 285, 349 (1999).
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jurisdiction is that claimants not receive double payment for the same injury. And under the
complementary doctrine, the International Criminal Court will be subordinate to national court
prosecution of criminals, likely prosecuting only in cases in which trial procedures may not be
available or may be ineffective. The CRT is unusual in that it is separate from any national
court and yet has been subsumed within a specific national court proceeding. That is, any
decision involving a Holocaust account rendered by the CRT will reduce the amount to be paid
as part of the distribution of the global settlement fund.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALIFY AND THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND BE SUED

Third, there is the issue of international legal personality. International legal personality
under international law has historically been viewed as vested only in states. Under this view,
individuals and corporate entities are not "legal actors" on the international plane, and a
grievance by such an individual or entity must be espoused by a government for the claim to
acquire the requisite standing before an international tribunal. The growth of international
courts and tribunals has called this historic doctrine into question, such that individuals and
corporate entities have the capacity to sue and be sued before many international courts and
tribunals.
The authority to sue depends on the treaty or agreement establishing the international
tribunal. The ICJ, WTO, International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, and UNCC continue to
require diplomatic espousal of claims by private persons or entities. Many other international
tribunals, however, authorize private parties to bring suit directly against a state. These include
the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and mass claims tribunals such as the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. And a few international tribunals, such as the international criminal
tribunals, allow action to be brought directly against private parties.
The difference should not be underestimated, for the competing approaches present
different problems. For tribunals that require diplomatic espousal of claims, private parties
often have difficulty convincing their government to espouse their claim. Even if the claim is
espoused, disagreements arise regarding the conduct of the litigation, such as the disagreement
by certain U.S. corporate claimants with the U.S. government position regarding jurisdiction
of the UNCC to compensate for Iraqi prewar debt. By contrast, tribunals that do not require
diplomatic espousal of claims are often flooded with claims, and these tribunals spend an
inordinate amount of time dismissing claims for want of jurisdiction or because the claims
otherwise lack merit. Despite the divergent principles regarding the capacity of private parties
to sue and be sued before international tribunals, the common thread that unites these tribunals
is state consent. By signing the treaty establishing the international court or tribunal, states
consent to being sued by individuals. And even in the absence of treaty ratification, a private
party may sue or be sued before an international tribunal in appropriate circumstances,
provided there is ad hoc consent by the state, in the form of instruments such as the ICSID
additional facility mechanisms.
EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A fourth major issue that merits further attention is the evidentiary standards of international tribunals. To my knowledge there has been no significant attempt to compare and
contrast these institutions' various evidentiary standards. Yet, as practitioners will attest,
evidentiary standards and the burden of proof are often among the most important factors for
claimants in calculating the likelihood of success. The standard of proof before some
international tribunals is remarkably low. For example, a claimant before the CRT must show
that it is "plausible" in light of all the circumstances that he or she is entitled to the dormant
account. This low threshold is appropriate and justifiable in light of the destruction of World

War H1and the Holocaust, and the long time that has lapsed since the opening of the accounts.
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But in rare cases it also can have some unsettling results. Thus, a clearly documented nephew
of the account holder may be denied the assets in the account because another claimant, who
asserts he is the long-lost son of the account holder, has pieced together enough anecdotal
information to make his story plausible.
By contrast, the burden of proof at other tribunals has quite a high threshhold. The IranUnited States Claims Tribunal requires clear and convincing evidence that a document is
forged. Acorporate claimant before the UNCC is required to establish to a "reasonable degree
of certainty" each element of its claim through documentary evidence. This too has led to
unsettling results. The UNCC has rejected claims for lack of documentation even when
claimants have proven that they surreptitiously returned to Baghdad to search for missing
documents, only to find that they have been destroyed by Iraqi authorities. The apparent logic
of such a high standard is that sophisticated construction companies should keep a duplicate
copy of every important document in the corporate headquarters.
There are numerous evidentiary questions that require scholarly attention. Does the
tribunal require documentary evidence, or are affidavits sufficient? What sanction does the
tribunal apply for recalcitrant defendants who ignore discovery requests? Does the tribunal
simply rely on the information available or does it apply adverse inferences? Does the tribunal
conduct its own investigation or is it authorized to appoint experts? What recourse is there for
the tribunal when witnesses lack credibility or there is evidence that testimony is given under
duress or is fabricated? These type of evidentiary questions are critical to the success or failure
of many claims before international tribunals, and more attention should be given to the
conduct of the court proceedings.
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND WHY NATIONS OBEY

Fifth, and more theoretical, the proliferation of international courts and tribunals also poses
more profound meta-questions regarding the conduct of international relations. For example,
a comparative analysis of international courts and tribunals offers clues as to why nations obey
international law. That is, one can examine international tribunals as one way of testing the
mettle of current theories of why nations obey international legal norms. There are numerous
theories as to why nations obey. Using the typology offered by Harold Koh, these include (I)
classical coercion models (nations obey international rules because they are compelled to do
so), (2) Henkin's rationalist model (nations obey international rules because the benefits
generally outweigh the costs), (3) Chayes's managerial model (nations obey international rules
not because they are threatened by sanction but because they are persuaded to comply by the
dynamic created by the treaty regimes to which they belong, e.g., they obey because of fear of
loss of reputation). (4) Franck's fairness model (nations obey because they are pulled toward
compliance by considerations of legitimacy and distributive justice, e.g., they obey because the
rules are fair and legitimate), and (5) Koh's transnational legal process model (nations obey
because of the complex process of domestic internalization of international legal norms)!
One can certainly find support for most ofthese models by examining international courts
and tribunals. The mandates of the UNCC and the ad hoe international criminal tribunals
arguably are obeyed as a result of coercion. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal arguably exists
because Iran calculated that the political costs of not cooperating were far outweighed by the
benefits of unfreezing Iranian assets and terminating U.S. court litigation. ICSID panels
established pursuant to investment protections in bilateral investment treaties represent a
similar rationalist calculation. Decisions of the ICJ and human rights tribunals often are
adhered to because of the legitimacy and inherent fairness of the norm enunciated and because
of fear of loss of reputation for noncompliance. The norms of the ECJ and the ECHR have
,&
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become internalized domestically, and these courts now are permanent fixtures on the European
legal landscape.
The effectiveness of a particular international court depends in large measure on the
theoretical rationale for why nations obey its mandates. One would think that courts that base
their authority on the coercive model would be among the most effective, but that has not
necessarily been the case. For coercive models to work, often one needs the international
equivalent of a national guard enforcing judicial authority in the face of Governor Wallace
standing at the schoolhouse door. The ad hoe criminal tribunals have been ineffective in
apprehending those persons on its most wanted list because the international forces have been
unwilling or unable to enforce its indictments. Just this week, the Washington Post reported
that an indicted war criminal, General Mladic, attended a soccer match in Belgrade and walked
right past the VIP box where the Yugoslav foreign minister and the Chinese ambassador were
sitting. Likewise, the coercive model of placing the Iraqi oil industry under UN receivership
and skimming off 30 percent of the oil revenues was wholly ineffective for many years because
Saddam Hussein simply refused to pump oil.
On the other hand, those tribunals established under a rationalist theory have been among
the most effective. Iran is still participating in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in part because
it is a claimant in a multibillion dollar military dispute with the United States. Likewise, for
most nations, the benefits of ICSID foreign investment protections far outweigh the costs of
investment protection provisions in bilateral investment treaties. On the trade front, one of the
great innovations of the WTO is that it has a mechanism for increasing the costs of noncompliance with retaliatory countermeasures. Yet rationalist models have their inherent limitations,
for cases do present themselves in which the costs of compliance outweigh the benefits. Few
can forget the international tremors that were felt when the European Union threatened to bring
suit against the United States over the Helms-Burton Act. One U.S. Government official bluntly
stated that the matter fell outside the WTO's competence, and that the United States would not
comply with any decision by the WTO. United States congressional leaders even went so far
as to state that they would rather pull out of the WTO than abide by a decision finding that
Helms-Burton violated the WTO obligations.
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Finally, the proliferation of international courts and tribunals and the increased reliance
on international legal norms also has greatly affected the conduct of international relations.
Perhaps the best example of this is the recent dispute over bananas. What began as a Central
American dispute over banana exports has now escalated into a major diplomatic dispute that
is having repercussions in the diplomatic hallways of Washington and Brussels as well as
aftershocks felt as far away as duck farms in France. One could say we are experiencing the
growing pains of the adolescent international rule of law.
Of course, more often than not international tribunals do not create diplomatic crises, they
solve them. Whatever conclusions one may draw regarding the relative success or failure of the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, it established a mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes that
is far preferable to the outcome that has resulted from the Cuban expropriations. One wonders
whether the United States would be able to make diplomatic overtures to Iran today if U.S.
nationals had never seen a measure of economic justice. One wonders whether the United
States would be making diplomatic overtures to Cuba if U.S. nationals had at some point
received just compensation for the billions that were unlawfully expropriated, obviating the
need or desire for Helms-Burton.
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals has created a situation in which the
normal rules of international diplomacy have changed. We now are in a situation in which new
choices are presented to governments when faced with international grievances. Whereas in the
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past the options could be placed along a continuum between quiet diplomacy and military
intervention, there are now new mechanisms for resolving, and creating, international pressure.
Government leaders throughout the world are now asking questions such as:
Should we use the threat to sue before the WTO over state sanctions against Burma as a
bargaining chip to encourage sanctions reform?
Will the establishment of a new international tribunal curtail or blunt the impact of class
action domestic court litigation?
What is the relevance of the indictment of Slobodan Molosevic as a war criminal in
brokering peace in Kosovo?
Should we reconsider the conviction of a political prisoner to avoid the loss of reputation
if a claim is filed against us before a human rights tribunal?
How much war reparations should be demanded of Iraq to adequately compensate Gulf
War claimants without repeating the mistakes of Versailles?
What will be the impact of future foreign investment if we are forced to litigate this oil
dispute before an ICSID panel?
These kinds of questions arise because the proliferation of international courts and tribunals
is changing the political and diplomatic landscape. Yet the growth has been so furious that
there has been little time to reflect on the importance of international tribunals as players, or,
more accurately, as pieces in the international chess game.
CONCLUSION

The proliferation of international courts and tribunals represents a profound change in
international law and international relations. One hundred years ago, the first global mechanism
for the settlement of international disputes was established with the creation of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration. The purpose of this tribunal was to "seek the most effective means of
ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and above all, of limiting the
progressive development of existing armaments. 6
One hundred years later, international courts and tribunals have proven to be among the
most important means for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Their impact is
being felt at the highest levels of government in Washington. Activists actually riot in the
streets because of concerns that the WTO lacks democratic legitimacy and disputes are decided
behind closed doors. The impact of these courts is also felt by soft-spoken Holocaust survivors
in Warsaw. Such claimants have described the filing of a claim as a cleansing, a release and a
forgiving of the past and an opportunity to have a new and honorable beginning. From public
protests to private petitions, these tribunals are changing the legal landscape.
Of course, international courts are only one mechanism among many to promote adherence
to international norms and resolve international disputes. But the ascendancy of international
adjudication cannot be denied, and the need for closer analysis of the newer international
tribunals is long overdue.
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